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The mission of the Independence Standards Board (ISB or 
Board) is to establish independence standards applicable to 
the audits of public entities in order to serve the public 
interest and to protect and promote investors’ confidence in 
the securities markets. Two of the founding precepts of the 
ISB are that (1) while many factors may affect the functioning 
of the capital markets, these markets will not function 
effectively unless investors have confidence in the information 
they use to make investment decisions, and (2) an 
independent audit is essential to providing that sense of 
confidence. If knowledgeable and reasonable investors 
believed that the independent auditor placed the interests of 
the accounting firm, the audit client, or any other person, 
over the interests of investors, then the value of the audit 
function would be impaired.
It is with this mission in mind, and while working 
concurrently on its project to establish a conceptual 
framework for auditor independence to serve as the 
foundation for principles-based independence standards, that 
the Board is studying the independence concerns related to 
audit firms providing legal services for SEC audit clients. As 
such, the Board seeks comment on the issues described in 
this Discussion Memorandum (DM).
The operating policies of the ISB are designed to permit 
timely, thorough, and open study of issues involving auditor 
independence and to encourage broad public participation in 
the process of establishing and improving independence 
standards. All of the ISB’s constituencies, including members 
of the public, are encouraged to express their views on 
matters under consideration in order to stimulate 
constructive public dialogue.
1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10036-8775 
(212) 596-6133 • fax (212) 596-6137 
Web site: www.cpaindependence.org
The ISB is seeking specific input on the questions posed at 
the end of this DM. In addition, we welcome comments and 
suggestions on any other aspect of the auditor independence 
issue related to the provision of legal services for SEC audit 
clients. The Board appreciates the time that respondents are 
taking to study this DM, and recognizes that the document is 
lengthy and the issues complex. It is not necessary for each 
respondent to respond to every question raised, although we 
certainly encourage that.
Any individual or organization may obtain one copy of this 
Discussion Memorandum (DM 99-4), without charge, by 
contacting the ISB. The ED is also available on the ISB 
website at www.cpaindependence.org.
Your responses, which must be received by February 29, 
2000, may be sent via:
1. mail: Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10036-8775
2. fax: (212) 596-6137
3. e-mail isb@cpaindependence. org
Please reference DM 99-4 in your correspondence.
All responses will be available for public inspection and 
copying for one year at the offices of the Independence 
Standards Board and also at the library of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), Harborside 
Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, NJ, telephone 
(201) 938-3000.
ISB Discussion Memoranda explore auditor independence 
issues in an effort to solicit debate and public comment. They 
do not in any way modify existing auditor independence 
requirements.
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Legal Services
Background and Executive Summary
Scope
1. This project poses the question, “under what circumstances, if any, can 
an audit firm or its affiliates provide legal services for SEC audit clients 
without impairing independence?” Situations involving attorneys providing 
legal advice directly to audit engagement teams (as governed by Statement of 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 73, “Using the Work of a Specialist”) are not 
covered by this project.
2. “Legal services, ” for the purposes of this Discussion Memorandum (DM), 
are defined as “those services that can only be provided by someone licensed 
to practice law.” (There are, of course, many services provided by licensed 
lawyers that are also routinely provided by audit firms and other non­
lawyers, including tax advisory services. Such services are expressly 
excluded from the definition of “legal services” used in this DM.) The Board 
acknowledges that, because legal licensing requirements vary by 
jurisdiction, this definition will relate to different services in different 
jurisdictions. However, the Board does not believe such variations should 
significantly detract from the development of an appropriate independence 
standard.
3. While a list of individual services comprising those possible as “legal 
services” under this DM likely is too long and subjective to be practical for 
inclusion here, such services sometimes are grouped in three categories that 
may be helpful in focusing this document:
a. Representing clients before courts and other adjudicatory bodies;
b. Preparing legal documents such as contracts, wills, and trust 
instruments; and
c. Providing legal advice to clients on the application of laws and 
regulations to particular facts.
Current Environment
4. Lawyers cannot currently practice law in partnership or share fees with 
audit firms (or other non-lawyers) in the United States because of various 
state laws and Bar Association rules. In many other countries, however, the 
rules are different. International audit firms have been rapidly developing 
large networks of affiliated law firms in Europe, South America, Australia 
and other parts of the world. In response, in August 1998 the American Bar 
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Association (ABA) appointed a Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice 
(CMDP) to assess the implications of these and related developments and to 
evaluate whether the current ABA Model Code ban on fee sharing between 
lawyers and non-lawyers should be retained. In June 1999, this 
Commission recommended that lawyers should be permitted to share legal 
fees with a non-lawyer, and deliver legal services through a multidisciplinary 
practice.1 However, at its annual meeting in August 1999, the ABA House 
of Delegates approved a resolution barring such affiliations unless further 
study shows they can be accomplished without harming clients or 
compromising lawyers’ independence.
1 “Recommendation.” American Bar Association. Commission on Multidisciplinary 
Practice. Chicago, IL. June, 1999, page 1.
5. There are currently restrictions on audit firms performing legal services 
for SEC audit clients. These restrictions are based on the belief that acting 
as auditor and attorney for the client are incompatible because the auditor’s 
primary responsibility is to the investing public, which requires 
independence (in fact and appearance), while the lawyer’s primary 
responsibility is to the client as a loyal advocate and zealous defender. 
There are also AICPA restrictions based on the belief that a lawyer’s 
advocacy may lead to a commonality of interests with the client, which, in 
turn, could result in a loss of objectivity and thus impair an auditor’s 
independence.
6. The Board understands that starting around 1993, certain audit firms 
began providing legal services to foreign subsidiaries of SEC audit clients 
and foreign SEC audit clients, based on a set of broad principles (which are 
described in paragraph 15).
Potential Threats to Independence
7. Potential threats to independence due to the provision of legal services 
generally focus on the following somewhat overlapping general categories: (1) 
a lawyer’s client advocacy role is incompatible with an auditor’s 
independence role; (2) attorney-client privilege is contrasted with the 
auditor’s focus on the protection of investors through proper public 
disclosure; and (3) persons providing legal services either fulfill a 
management role and participate in management decisions or their advice 
becomes the basis for reliance that could place the audit firm in the position 
of reviewing its own work.
Safeguards for Independence
8. Firms have represented that they have developed or are developing 
quality controls (or safeguards) to ensure the firm’s independence when a 
member of the firm provides legal services to an audit client. Some believe 
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these safeguards adequately address the additional conflicts and pressures 
on independence that are created when an audit firm provides legal services 
to its audit clients. Others believe that, in part because of the strength of 
the incentives to provide legal services, the firms’ safeguards do not 
adequately address those additional conflicts and pressures.
Range of Possible Independence Requirements
9. This DM discusses five possible approaches to establishing independence 
requirements in this area. The requirements cover a wide range, and include 
variations based upon degrees of advocacy, materiality and safeguards.
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Legal Services
Discussion of Issues
Introduction
10. In a January 1999 letter to the Chairman of the ISB, one of the issues 
the Chief Accountant of the SEC requested the Board to place on its agenda 
was “Legal Advisory Services.” The letter stated, with respect to this topic:
“Press reports have cited the expansion of independent auditors into 
legal services. These services may involve representing clients before the 
Internal Revenue Service, providing advice on structuring corporate 
transactions and benefit plans, providing expert witness testimony on 
behalf of clients, etc. Providing legal services appears to be more 
predominant in foreign countries, but at least one recent press report 
cited one of the international firms as considering the acquisition of a 
New York law firm in the future. The Big Five accounting firms could 
provide the ISB with more accurate information as to the exact nature 
and types of services being provided.
“The Commission has held in the Codification of Financial Reporting 
Policies, Section 602.02e.ii, that an accountant-attorney relationship 
with a client is inconsistent with the appearance of independence. This is 
due in part to the primary concerns attorneys have with the personal 
rights and interests of their clients and the advocacy role they are 
expected to undertake.
“You may wish to consult with the American Bar Association 
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, which also is studying this 
issue.”2
2 Letter. Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, SEC to William T. Allen, Chairman, ISB. 
January 7, 1999, page 3.
11. While the question “Under what circumstances, if any, can an audit firm 
or its affiliates provide legal services for SEC audit clients without impairing 
independence?” may appear straightforward, it raises a number of issues, 
including:
a. Why is the question so relevant and important now?
b. What is the current regulatory environment?
c. What are the arguments for audit firms providing legal services?
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d. What are the arguments against audit firms providing legal services, 
particularly with respect to threats to auditors’ independence?
e. What range of possible independence requirements should be 
considered?
f. Transition issues (whether or not legal services are permitted 
prospectively) and other matters.
Each of these items will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
Relevance and Importance of the Question
12. As indicated in the SEC Chief Accountant’s letter, audit firms, partly in 
response to client expectations and partly because of what they view as a 
natural extension of their other service lines, have begun offering legal 
services to their clients, including foreign units of SEC audit clients.  This 
development has not occurred in the United States because of regulatory 
constraints, but it has caused the U.S. legal profession to consider a 
response. For example, in August 1998, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
appointed a Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (CMDP) to assess the 
implications of these and related developments and to evaluate whether the 
current ABA Model Code ban on fee sharing between lawyers and non­
lawyers should be retained. In June 1999, this Commission unanimously 
recommended that lawyers should be permitted to share legal fees with a 
non-lawyer, and deliver legal services through a multidisciplinary practice.  
However, at its annual meeting in August 1999, the ABA House of Delegates 
approved a resolution barring such affiliations unless further study shows 
they can be accomplished without harming clients or compromising lawyers’ 
independence. It should be noted that even if the ABA ultimately endorses 
multidisciplinary practices, state rules, and, in some cases, laws, would 
have to be changed to permit such practices.
3
4
3 The firms have adopted no single model for delivering legal services. Instead, their 
approach depends upon the rules of the relevant country. In some countries, they have 
developed affiliations with independent law firms. In other countries, legal services may 
be offered by the accounting firm or by a separate law firm in partnership with the 
accounting firm.
4 “Recommendation.” American Bar Association. Commission on Multidisciplinary 
Practice. Op. Cit.
Current Regulatory Environment
13. Throughout this section on the “Current Regulatory Environment,” the 
distinction between the primary responsibilities of auditors and lawyers is 
evaluated. That is, the auditor’s primary responsibility is to the public 
through independence in both fact and appearance, resulting in an 
objective audit. On the other hand, the lawyer’s primary responsibility is to 
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the client as adviser and advocate. While the duties of lawyers and auditors 
are not identical, some argue there are many similarities. They point out 
that both auditors and lawyers do not, in most cases, voluntarily reveal 
client confidences without client consent; that neither can continue to 
advise a client who knowingly makes false statements to third parties, 
including corporate shareholders, the investing public, tribunals, the SEC 
and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and that, under the federal 
securities laws, both are obligated not to make misrepresentations or 
omissions about material matters and must take certain actions to prevent 
their clients from doing so. Others conclude that the primary roles of 
auditors and lawyers are different, and an auditor’s independence 
responsibilities and obligations to disclose information to the public are 
incompatible with an attorney’s advocacy responsibilities and attorney-client 
privilege.
14. The views of the Office of the Chief Accountant (OCA) of the SEC are 
contained in a letter to the Chair of the ABA’s CMDP. This letter, excerpts of 
which are contained in the Appendix, cites both a United States Supreme 
Court decision and SEC regulations. These positions are also outlined in a 
letter to the ABA dated July 12, 1999 from the SEC’s General Counsel, Chief 
Accountant and Director of Enforcement. That letter states in part:
“...while the SEC has taken no position on multidisciplinary practice per 
se, the SEC has long made clear that its independence rules prohibit an 
auditor from certifying the financial statements of a client with which his 
firm also has an attorney-client relationship. Indeed, just several weeks 
ago, the SEC issued an order formally disciplining an attorney­
accountant who gave legal advice to an audit client of another partner in 
his accounting firm. In its order, the SEC reiterated its long-held 
position that the attorney-client relationship is inconsistent with the 
independence required of accountants in reporting to investors. Matter 
of Charles E. Falk, Exch. Act Rel. No. 41426, AAE Rel. No. 1136, 1999 
SEC LEXIS 1013, 1999 WL 311802 (SEC) (May 19, 1999).
“...all involved should realize that the SEC will continue vigorous 
enforcement of its rules on auditor independence and that, unless and 
until those rules are modified, those rules prohibit an auditor from 
certifying the financial statements of a client with which his firm also has 
an attorney-client relationship.”5
5 Letter. Harvey J. Goldschmid, Chief Counsel, SEC, Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, 
SEC, and Richard H. Walker, Director of Enforcement, SEC to Philip S. Anderson, Esq., 
President, ABA. July 12, 1999.
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15. The Board understands that starting around 1993 certain audit firms 
began providing legal services to foreign subsidiaries of SEC audit clients 
and foreign SEC audit clients, based on a set of broad principles described 
below:
a. The subject matter is not material to the financial statements on 
which the firm is reporting;
b. The service is permitted by the laws of the relevant country;
c. The legal services provided do not involve acting as general counsel or 
management; and
d. The matter involved and the legal relationship with the client are 
unlikely to be highly visible.
16. In addition to the SEC regulations just cited, the AICPA’s Code of 
Professional Conduct (the Code) emphasizes the need for a member in public 
practice to be independent in fact and appearance when providing audit 
services. It is important to note that all auditors must comply with the 
independence requirements of the AICPA. (Auditors of public companies 
must also comply with ISB/SEC rules where these are more restrictive.) The 
Code states, in pertinent part:
“Objectivity is a state of mind, a quality that lends value to a member’s 
services. It is a distinguishing feature of the profession. The principle of 
objectivity imposes the obligation to be impartial, intellectually honest, 
and free of conflicts of interest. Independence precludes relationships 
that may appear to impair a member’s objectivity in rendering attestation 
services.
“...For a member in public practice, the maintenance of objectivity and 
independence requires a continuing assessment of client relationships 
and public responsibility. Such a member who provides auditing and 
other attestation services should be independent in fact and appearance. 
In providing all other services, a member should maintain objectivity and 
avoid conflicts of interests.”6
6AICPA Professional Standards: Code of Professional Conduct. AICPA, New York. June
1, 1998, ET§55.03, p. 4321.
The Code further recognizes that accounting firms sometimes provide 
professional services that involve client advocacy, and that advocacy on 
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behalf of a client does not necessarily compromise the firm’s independence 
with respect to the client. The Code7 provides:
7Op. Cit. ET§ 102.07 (Interpretation 102-6), p. 4443.
8Ibid.
“Professional services involving client advocacy. A member or a 
member’s firm may be requested by a client—
“ 1. to perform tax or consulting services engagements that involve acting 
as an advocate for the client.
“2. to act as an advocate in support of the client’s position on accounting 
or financial reporting issues, either within the firm or outside the firm 
with standard setters, regulators, or others.
“Services provided or actions taken pursuant to such types of client requests 
are professional services [ET section 92.100] governed by the Code of 
Professional Conduct and...in the performance of any professional service, a 
member shall comply with Rule 102 [ET section 102.01], which requires 
maintaining objectivity and integrity and prohibits subordination of 
judgment to others. When performing professional services requiring 
independence, a member shall also comply with rule 101 [ET Section 
101.01] of the Code of Professional Conduct.
“Moreover, there is a possibility that some requested professional services 
involving client advocacy may appear to stretch the bounds of performance 
standards, may go beyond sound and reasonable professional practice, or 
may compromise credibility, and thereby pose an unacceptable risk of 
impairing the reputation of the member and his or her firm with respect to 
independence, integrity and objectivity. In such circumstances, the member 
and the member’s firm should consider whether it is appropriate to perform 
the service.”8
17. On the other hand, the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model 
Rules) stress more the lawyer’s responsibility to the client. For example, the 
preamble to the ABA Model Rules states:
“As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As 
advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the 
client’s legal rights and obligations and explains their practical 
implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position 
under the rules of the advocacy system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a 
result advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of 
honest dealing with others. As intermediary between clients, a lawyer 
seeks to reconcile their divergent interests as an advisor and, to a limited 
extent, as a spokesperson for each client. A lawyer acts as evaluator by  
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examining a client’s legal affairs and reporting about them to the client 
or to others.”9
9 ABA Compendium of Professional Responsibility Rules and Standards, 1999 Edition. 
ABA, Chicago, IL, 1999. Page 13.
Potential Threats to Independence
18. Potential threats to the independence of an audit firm from the firm 
providing legal services to an SEC audit client generally fall into five 
somewhat overlapping categories:
a. A lawyer’s duty to advance the client’s position may involve a degree 
of advocacy (potentially creating a commonality of interest and the 
related loss of objectivity) that is incompatible with auditor 
independence;
b. Acting in a management role, for example, functioning as general 
counsel when it involves making or participating in management 
decisions, is also incompatible with auditor independence;
c. Providing corporate secretarial services, such as maintenance of stock 
records or preparing minutes of meetings, may be equivalent to 
maintaining client accounting records (i.e., “bookkeeping”) and 
therefore could involve the firm auditing its own work;
d. Auditors rely upon representations from counsel about the likely 
outcome of material litigation or the definition or enforceability of, 
or compliance requirements concerning contracts, and, if the 
lawyer were with an affiliated firm, it could also be perceived as the 
equivalent of auditing the firm’s own work; and
d. The general need for a lawyer to maintain client confidentiality may 
reduce the flow of information within the accounting firm that is 
required to ensure proper client disclosure to the public.
Safeguards for Independence
19. Certain safeguards have been suggested to mitigate any potential threats 
to independence raised in a particular situation, such as:
a. Include the individuals performing legal services in an affiliated but 
separate entity from that performing the audit services. The objective 
would be to separate the management of those services so as to 
reduce the possible and perceived commonality of interest of the 
different service providers.
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b. Discuss the legal services provided, or to be provided, with the audit 
committee or board of directors of the client to enable it to make an 
informed decision regarding the impact performing such services has 
on the accounting firm’s independence.
c. Require additional internal quality assurance or external peer review 
of the audits for clients for whom legal services were also provided, to 
mitigate the self-review concern.
d. Prohibit legal services which involve matters that, in the aggregate, 
would reasonably be expected to have a material impact on the 
client’s financial statements.
e. Use a different firm to audit a client subsidiary for which the client’s 
primary auditor provided (significant) legal services, to avoid potential 
self-review problems that might result if a firm audited such a client 
subsidiary.
f. Obtain a waiver from the client to permit lawyers of the accounting 
firm to discuss with auditors of that same firm otherwise confidential 
audit-related information coming to their attention, to comply with 
auditing requirements, facilitate client disclosure to the public, and 
eliminate any perceived threat to the flow of information with the 
firm.
20. Others, however, are generally skeptical about the effectiveness of 
safeguards to protect auditor independence when conflicts arise between (a) 
the attorney-client privilege and the attorney’s responsibilities to be a 
zealous advocate for the client and (b) the auditor’s responsibilities to 
protect the public investor and maintain professional skepticism and 
independence in fact and appearance.
Arguments for Audit Firms Providing Legal Services
21. Some proponents of audit firms being permitted to provide legal services 
to their SEC audit clients suggest there are two principal reasons for doing 
so. First, auditor independence would not be impaired since auditors, like 
all professional service providers, are advocates to some degree, and there is 
little difference between many legal services and the other non-audit services 
the firm may provide, and, second, the proponents believe it is in the public 
interest to provide such legal services.
Some supporters assert that many legal services are similar to other 
advisory services (e.g., accounting advice) provided only for the benefit of the 
client, and not in an adversarial position against any third party. Therefore, 
since an audit firm can properly perform these other advisory services for 
clients that it audits, supporters suggest the firm should also be allowed to 
perform similar legal services.
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Their rationale with respect to auditor independence not being impaired 
centers on the concepts that independence cannot be measured by an 
absolute “bright line” based on whether the service involves advocacy 
because all professional service providers, including auditors, are advocates 
of their clients’ positions to some extent. Instead, supporters suggest a 
safeguards approach based on relevant facts and circumstances.
On this graduated scale, there may be some legal services that are of 
such a public “adversarial” nature and that differ sufficiently from other 
services provided by auditors to warrant either special safeguards or 
outright prohibition. For example, representing an audit client in a court 
proceeding might be considered sufficiently adversarial to be proscribed if 
the matter involves material amounts. On the other hand, preparing legal 
documents and/or advising audit clients on the application of laws might be 
limited enough in terms of their adversarial nature to be acceptable. Some 
supporters suggest that legal services could be provided by an audit firm to 
an audit client if the services were carefully limited to be of low degrees of 
both advocacy and materiality, and if appropriate safeguards were used.
Others believe that legal services should be permitted to be offered by an 
independent, but affiliated, law firm of the audit firm. They suggest that 
where legal services are offered by individuals who are not in partnership 
with the auditors, any threats, whether in fact or in appearance, are 
dramatically reduced, and therefore the range of legal services that could be 
offered by the affiliated law firm should not be limited.
22. In their second principal argument, supporters contend that the rules 
should permit audit firms to provide legal services for an audit client 
because they believe it is also in the public interest, since the client could be 
better served in one or more specific ways. For example, the client:
a. May realize a more effective and efficient audit from a firm that is able 
to take advantage of its shared common body of knowledge 
concerning the business, accounting and legal aspects of the 
corporation;
b. Will have a wider choice of lawyers, by not being precluded from 
using lawyers affiliated with the audit firm;
c. May be better able to satisfy the need for comprehensive and global 
solutions to complex problems which also include legal, financial and 
business dimensions, due to the world-wide perspective and diverse 
expertise of the audit firm;
d. Would potentially have easier and more rapid access to a legal 
services provider of known standards in a domestic or overseas 
location with which the client is unfamiliar;
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e. May receive less conflicting advice from a coordinated provider of both 
auditing and legal services; and
f. Could achieve a reduction in total audit and legal fees because of the 
more current and in-depth knowledge of the corporation by the 
combined auditing/legal firm, as well as other efficiencies such a 
multidisciplinary firm will be able to share with clients.
In sum, the items noted above may provide the potential for improved 
auditing, plus efficiencies to the corporation, which could ultimately flow to 
the public through higher profits or lower prices.
23. Supporters also respond to some of the arguments against permitting 
legal services as follows:
a. With regard to the argument that legal services should be prohibited, 
they assert that the SEC does not apply such a “bright line” rule to 
other similar advisory services, and that a “bright line” ban is not 
necessary to serve the public interest.
b. With regard to the argument that attorney/client privilege creates a 
special relationship with a lawyer which is inconsistent with the role 
of an auditor, they respond that audit firms also have a privilege 
governing some aspects of their practice—i.e., the federal tax 
practitioner privilege, and accountant/client privilege statutes in 
some states—and that the ethical rules governing CPAs require 
confidentiality of client information.  They also point out that a 
client who receives legal services from an unrelated law firm cannot 
permissibly shield from public disclosure material information simply 
by communicating that information to its lawyer.
10
c. With regard to any appearance problem that might exist, they believe 
that investors and capital markets would not be any better off if 
lawyers and auditors were in separate firms and that, in fact, failure 
of lawyers to disclose information to auditors may be more likely to 
happen when that is the case.
10 The Supreme Court has stated that “no confidential accountant-client privilege exists 
under federal law, and no state-created privilege has been recognized in federal cases.” 
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973). The Supreme Court further stated, 
“Endowing the workpapers of an independent auditor with a work-product immunity 
would destroy the appearance of auditor’s independence by creating the impression that 
the auditor is an advocate of the client. If investors were to view the auditor as an 
advocate for the corporate client, the value of the audit function itself might well be 
lost.” Arthur Young v. United States, 465 U.S. 819-20 (1984). This precedent is 
unchanged by the federal tax practitioner privilege.
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Arguments Against Audit Firms Providing Legal Services
24. Those opposed to audit firms providing legal services for their audit 
clients point out that the purpose of an audit by an independent auditor is 
to enhance investor confidence in the financial statements of those audit 
clients. They believe that the broad public interest arguments set forth by 
the proponents are secondary to maintaining the confidence of the investor. 
Moreover, in response to paragraphs 22-23 above, they would note that:
a. The attorney is generally bound by the attorney-client privilege and 
thus prevented from sharing knowledge concerning the business, 
accounting and legal aspects of the corporation, while disclosure to 
the auditor would generally nullify the assertion of the attorney-client 
privilege against all others and might possibly result in a matter being 
disclosed to the public.
b. Some believe that lawyers have no expertise in auditing so that there 
is no added knowledge or efficiency in the audit by permitting the 
audit firm to offer legal services to the client. Others believe that 
permitting an audit firm to provide legal services to an audit client 
will increase an audit firm’s liability since the audit firm will be held 
to have corporate knowledge of sensitive client matters.
c. Those that argue against the audit firm providing legal services to its 
audit clients note that there are bright line rules to certain other 
services to enhance investor confidence in audited financial 
statements (e.g., a complete proscription against acting as a broker­
dealer for an audit client, or as an actuary determining policy 
reserves for an insurance company audit client).
25. Those who oppose audit firms providing legal services to their audit 
clients believe the advocacy/independence distinction discussed earlier is 
pervasive, critical and irreconcilable. That is, a lawyer’s responsibility to the 
client of advocacy, loyalty and a zealous defense of the client’s position is a 
totally different role that cannot be reconciled with the auditor’s 
responsibility to the public of independence and objectivity. Also, “auditors 
are the only professionals that an entity must engage before it may sell 
securities in the United States, and the only professionals charged by law to 
act independently from management.”  (Emphasis in original.)11
11 Letter. Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, SEC to Sherwin P. Simmons, Chair, 
CMDP, Op. Cit., page 1.
More specifically, those against audit firms providing legal services to 
their audit clients include the following among their arguments:
a. Independence should be measured on a “bright line” basis. That is, 
an auditor either is or is not independent—it is not a question of
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“degree” or “relative” independence—and providing legal services of 
any kind impairs independence and should thus be proscribed.
b. A clear and sharp distinction must be made between the auditor’s 
role requiring independence and objectivity and the lawyer’s primary 
role of advocacy, and that any degree of client advocacy is 
unacceptable for an auditor, given the auditor’s responsibility to the 
public.
c. Legal services are qualitatively different from other non-audit services 
in view of the attributes of client advocacy and loyalty, and 
attorney-client privilege.
d. At least an appearance problem would exist (i.e., investors and the 
capital markets would be concerned) if a lawyer employed by the 
audit firm knew of a major problem and failed to disclose it to the 
auditors, even if such non-disclosure was technically appropriate.
e. Maintaining investor confidence in the financial statements of the 
audit client is the purpose of independent audits and far outweighs 
the positive “public interest” arguments in favor of legal services that 
are said by some to emphasize, generally, the benefits of increased 
client knowledge, “one-stop shopping,” and cost savings. It is also 
argued that these benefits are somewhat nebulous. They suggest a 
more valid “public interest” benefit would be for auditors to assist 
investors by doing nothing which might impair their independence.
Range of Possible Independence Requirements
26. The following table sets forth some alternative approaches to establishing 
independence standards in this area, and they are discussed in the 
paragraphs which follow.
20
27
. T
AB
LE
LE
G
AL
 S
E
R
VI
C
E
S
R
AN
G
E
 O
F 
PO
SS
IB
LE
 IN
D
EP
E
N
D
EN
C
E 
R
E
Q
U
IR
E
M
EN
TS
N
O
TE
S
1.
 
R
eg
ul
at
or
y/
le
ga
l r
es
tr
ic
tio
ns
 a
ffe
ct
in
g 
th
e 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
f l
eg
al
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
ar
e 
no
t c
on
si
de
re
d 
he
re
 a
s 
th
ey
 a
re
 b
ey
on
d 
th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
 th
is
 p
ro
je
ct
.
2.
 
W
hi
le
 th
e 
ab
ov
e 
fiv
e 
al
te
rn
at
iv
es
 m
ay
 o
ve
rl
ap
 to
 so
m
e 
de
gr
ee
, t
he
ir
 d
et
ai
ls
 m
ig
ht
 fu
rt
he
r b
e 
co
m
bi
ne
d 
to
 p
ro
du
ce
 s
til
l 
di
ffe
re
nt
 a
pp
ro
ac
he
s.
21
I
Le
ga
l S
er
vi
ce
s 
Ar
e 
N
ot
 
__
__
__
_P
er
m
itt
ed
 
 
N
o lega
l servi
ce
s 
sh
ou
ld
 be
 pe
rf
or
m
ed
 
fo
r an
 au
di
t cli
en
t. 
Th
is
 is 
be
ca
us
e,
 at 
le
as
t from 
an
 
ap
pe
ar
an
ce
 v
ie
w
po
in
t, 
su
ch
 se
rv
ic
es
 in
vo
lv
e 
ad
vo
ca
cy
 for 
th
e 
cl
ie
nt
, therefore 
cr
ea
tin
g 
a
co
m
m
on
al
ity
 of 
in
te
re
st
, w
hi
ch
 lea
ds
 
to
 a 
pe
rc
ei
ve
d l
os
s o
f 
ob
je
ct
iv
ity
 that 
is
 
in
co
m
pa
tib
le
 with 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
.
II 
D
eg
re
es
 o
f A
dv
oc
ac
y 
Le
ga
l se
rv
ic
es
 cou
ld
 
be
 se
gr
eg
at
ed
 b
y 
th
ei
r 
va
ry
in
g deg
re
es
 of 
ad
vo
ca
cy
. T
ho
se
 w
ith
 
a low 
en
ou
gh
 
ad
vo
ca
cy
 lev
el
 cou
ld
 
be
 
co
ns
id
er
ed
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
, while 
th
os
e w
ith
 a 
hi
gh
er
 
le
ve
l could 
be
 
pr
os
cr
ib
ed
.
III
M
ag
ni
tu
de
 
Le
ga
l se
rv
ic
es
 cou
ld
 
be
 
co
ns
id
er
ed
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
 o
nl
y 
if 
th
ey
 
ar
e below
 some 
“m
ag
ni
tu
de
” t
es
t. F
or
 
ex
am
pl
e,
 services
 
co
ul
d b
e co
ns
id
er
ed
 
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
 if 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 imp
ac
t on
 
th
e 
cl
ie
nt
 c
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
m
at
er
ia
l.
IV
Sa
fe
gu
ar
ds
 
Sa
fe
gu
ar
ds
 cou
ld
 be 
es
ta
bl
is
he
d,
 su
ch
 as 
“fi
re
w
al
ls
,” affi
lia
te
d 
bu
t sep
ar
at
e au
di
t 
an
d law
 firm
s;
 or 
cl
ie
nt
 “w
ai
ve
rs
” m
ay
 
be
 ob
ta
in
ed
 to
 pe
rm
it 
la
w
ye
r-
au
di
to
r 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n.
 
O
th
er
 sa
fe
gu
ar
ds
 al
so
 
ar
e p
os
si
bl
e,
 su
ch
 as
 
ha
vi
ng
 a 
di
ffe
re
nt
 
au
di
to
r for 
a 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 
w
he
re
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 legal 
se
rv
ic
es
 w
er
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 
by
 the 
pr
im
ar
y 
au
di
to
r.
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_
V
Le
ga
l S
er
vi
ce
s 
Ar
e   
__
__
__
_
Pe
rm
itt
ed
__
__
__
_ 
Th
er
e sh
ou
ld
 be
 no
 
re
st
ri
ct
io
ns
 on 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 based
 
up
on
 the 
se
rv
ic
es
 
be
in
g “
le
ga
l s
er
vi
ce
s.
” 
H
ow
ev
er
, other 
re
st
ri
ct
io
ns
 would 
ap
pl
y,
 so 
th
at
 any
 
su
ch
 se
rv
ic
es
 sh
ou
ld
 
no
t, i
n t
he
 ag
gr
eg
at
e,
 
re
su
lt i
n t
he
 au
di
to
r 
be
co
m
in
g a
 de
 fac
to
 
em
pl
oy
ee
 or
 of
fic
er
 of
 
th
e 
cl
ie
nt
.
28. Alternative I—Legal Services Are Not Permitted. Supporters of the 
position that no legal services should be performed for audit clients by the 
auditor strongly endorse the “bright line” hypothesis that advocacy for the 
client is incompatible with auditor independence because of the risk of a 
loss of objectivity and the related threats of commonality of interests and 
self-review. In addition, they argue that legal services are qualitatively 
different enough from other professional services (e.g., in terms of their 
advocacy, client loyalty and attorney-client privilege considerations), to 
render them contrary to the auditor’s first duty to the public and thus 
warrant prohibition. This requirement is supported by certain existing legal 
decisions and regulations, and is clear, concise and understandable. 
However, it could be considered by some to be unnecessarily restrictive.
29. Alternative II—Degree of Advocacy. A less restrictive approach would be 
one based on the degree of advocacy. This could be important to those who 
believe that some level of advocacy is a factor in the services of all 
professional service providers and that the degree of independence may be 
measured on other than a “bright line” basis. Some also express the view 
that the important criterion is independence in fact, which they believe 
would be retained in these circumstances, rather than independence in 
appearance.
Hence, supporters of this view would suggest that providing legal services 
with a high degree of advocacy (for example, representing clients in court) 
should be proscribed, but providing services with a lesser degree of advocacy 
(such as preparation of legal documents or advising on the application of 
laws in routine and minor situations) should be considered acceptable in 
view of these services being relatively low in advocacy. They also note it 
would raise fewer concerns about independence in appearance.
Supporters of this view believe that at some point advocacy creates a 
commonality of interest which dilutes the degree of healthy skepticism and 
objectivity required of an auditor, and thus may lead to an impairment of 
independence. Some would consider these restrictions to be a logical and 
understandable response to the advocacy issue and the related commonality 
of interest threats raised to the auditor’s objectivity and independence, as 
well as the appearance issue. Others may believe they are either too 
restrictive or not sufficiently restrictive.
30. Alternative III—Magnitude. Instead of focusing on advocacy, a different 
approach could consider legal services acceptable only if they fell below 
some magnitude limitation. For example, legal services handled by the firm 
could be considered acceptable if they relate to a legal matter  for which the 
financial impact on the client would be immaterial. Those legal services that 
would have a material effect on the client would be prohibited. This 
restriction attempts to correlate and assign restrictions explicitly based on 
the degree of materiality, and, therefore, presumably also on the related 
degree of threat. Critics contend that this approach would be too subjective.
12
12 (and all legal matters in the aggregate)
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31. Alternative IV—Safeguards. Another approach would involve the use of 
safeguards, which some would view as sufficiently mitigating the threats to 
permit the performance of a least some legal services. For example, the 
firm’s organization can be changed (e.g., separate but affiliated firms  or 
operations) to emphasize differing reporting and management channels for 
the legal and audit services, or “firewalls” could be constructed (although 
present Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS)—which require 
communication within the firm of all audit-related matters—would currently 
not permit them). Alternatively, client waivers (if permitted in the 
jurisdiction) could be obtained to allow intra-firm communication of 
otherwise confidential audit-related information.  New firm policies could 
also provide safeguards. For example, policies might include special in- 
depth pre-report-issuance partner reviews and post-issuance quality 
assurance and peer reviews. Another safeguard could be that if significant 
legal services are performed for a subsidiary of the audit client, a different 
audit firm must audit that entity to provide an intermediate level of review. 
While an approach using safeguards could reduce the threat to auditor 
independence, it might be complex in implementation and unsatisfactory to 
some because they would not consider the threats to be sufficiently 
mitigated.
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14
32. Alternative V—Legal Services Are Permitted. Finally, there could be no 
specific restrictions on performance based upon the services being “legal 
services.” However, general restrictions would apply, so that any such 
services should not result in the auditor becoming a de facto employee or 
officer of the client, or in the auditor otherwise performing a management 
role, or auditing its own work.
13 The Board also has a separate project underway on “Evolving Forms of Firm 
Structure and Organization.”
14 The use of waivers might also cause certain legal difficulties for clients, and this 
possibility should be considered and evaluated on a case-by-case basis, although it is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
Transition Issues and Other Matters
33. It should be noted that not all legal services eventually viewed in an audit 
context would have been performed initially for an audit client. For 
example, when an audit firm gains a new client (including by merger either 
of the corporation or the audit firm) legal services which are not permitted 
for an audit client might have been performed for the previous non-audit 
client company. While such “transition” issues do not involve performing 
services for a client, they may result in a subsequent audit reviewing work 
the firm performed in a prior legal services role. An additional transition 
concern could be a situation in which an audit firm performed legal services 
that were not proscribed when performed, but are not permitted under new 
regulations (e.g., a final standard resulting from this project).
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34. Among the possible solutions to the transition issues noted above are the 
following:
a. Considering independence to be impaired if a now-proscribed legal 
service still has a significant and on-going effect on the financial 
statements of the client;
b. “Grandfathering” certain previously performed but now proscribed 
services, but disallowing the performance of any new such services;
c. Requiring the current audit of that business segment of the client 
which received the now-proscribed legal service to be performed by a 
different audit firm than the principal auditor; or
d. Handling transition issues on a case-by-case basis.
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Questions for Respondents
Q1. The Discussion Memorandum, in paragraph 2, defines “legal services” as 
“those services that can only be provided by someone licensed to practice 
law.” Do you believe that definition is appropriate for this analysis, or that it 
needs to be expanded or reduced, and, if so, how and why?
Q2. Should the Board consider cost/benefit factors, and, if so, what are these 
factors, and how would they be measured?
Q3. A. This DM describes a number of potential threats and other factors to 
be considered in determining the independence implications of an audit firm 
providing legal services to audit clients. It also describes arguments as to 
why the threats are not substantial, or how they can be cured with 
safeguards. Are there additional threats which you believe should be 
addressed? Also, are there other safeguards that should be considered? If 
so, please describe each of them and their importance.
B. Would you be concerned, and why, if you became aware that a lawyer 
employed by the audit firm and performing legal services for the audit client, 
knew of a major client problem and failed to disclose it fully to the auditors 
because the information was protected by the attorney-client privilege? Do 
you expect the risk of such occurrences to increase or decrease if the lawyer 
and auditor are in the same firm, and, if so, why?
C. This DM discusses potential benefits to the client and to the public 
from the provision of legal services by an audit firm. Do you agree or 
disagree with these potential benefits, and why?
Q4. Do you believe that the safeguards described in the DM would mitigate 
any potential threats to an auditor’s independence when legal services are 
performed? Why, and if yes, which safeguards are important to you?
Q5. The DM discusses whether or not to prohibit legal services by an audit 
firm to an audit client, and describes several categories of legal services that 
could be permitted, based on their degree of advocacy and materiality. Do 
you believe that those factors should be considered in determining the 
acceptability of legal services? Or, should other factors be considered, and, 
if so, which ones and why? Please identify those specific categories of legal 
services which could be offered by an audit firm to an audit client and 
indicate which you believe should be permitted and/or prohibited, and why.
Q6. This DM also describes, as a possible safeguard, provision of legal 
services by an associated, but separate, law firm. Do you believe that the 
scope of permitted legal services should change if those services were to be 
offered by a separate, but affiliated law firm, rather than by the audit firm 
itself? If so, what factors in the relationship between the law firm and the 
audit firm influence your opinion? How important are such factors as the 
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degree of association, profit/cost sharing, cross-referring of work, 
management structure, use of a common name, etc.?
Q7. One transition issue, described in paragraph 33, involves the situation in 
which a firm acquires, as an audit client, a company for which it had 
previously provided legal services proscribed for audit clients. How should 
this situation be resolved—by any of the approaches offered in paragraph 
34, or by some other method?
Q8. The Board’s mandate includes the use of both original and archival 
research to facilitate the development of principles-based independence 
standards. Is there any existing research, or research that the Board could 
commission, which would be beneficial to this project? Please provide any 
specific suggestions for new research, as well as your knowledge of the 
availability of any existing research.
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Appendix
The views of the Office of the Chief Accountant (OCA) of the SEC are 
outlined in a letter to the chair of the ABA’s CMDP. This letter cites both a 
United States Supreme Court decision and SEC regulations, and states, in 
part:
(The Supreme Court Decision)
“The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Arthur Young, 465 
US 805 (1984), indicated that the purpose of independent audits under 
the federal securities laws is to enhance the credibility of financial 
information and, in turn, the securities markets. To accomplish this 
purpose successfully, investors must be confident that auditors will 
place investors’ interests above all else, including the interests of the 
client and the accounting firm. In explaining the need for auditors to 
place investors’ interests over those of the client, the Court noted, 'If 
investors were to view the auditor as an advocate for the corporate client, 
the value of the audit function itself might well be lost.’
“In contrasting the role of the attorney with that of the independent 
accountant, the US Supreme Court stated, ‘...the private attorney’s role 
[is] the client’s confidential adviser and advocate, a loyal representative 
whose duty it is to present the client’s case in the most favorable light. 
An independent certified public accountant performs a different role. By 
certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation’s 
financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility 
transcending any employment relationship with the client. The 
independent public accountant performing this special function owes 
ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as 
well as to the investing public. This ‘public watchdog’ function demands 
that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all 
times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.’ ” (Emphasis in 
original.)
(The SEC Regulations)
“The Commission’s auditor independence regulations specifically state 
that the roles of auditors and attorneys under the federal securities laws 
are incompatible. Rule 2-01(c) of Regulation S-X, 17 CFR 210.2-01(c), 
states that in determining whether an accountant is independent of a 
particular person, the Commission ‘will give appropriate consideration to 
all relevant circumstances, including evidence bearing on all 
relationships between the accountant and that person or any affiliate 
thereof, and will not confine itself to the relationships existing in 
connection with the filing of reports with the Commission.’ The 
Commission further stated in an interpretive release, which has been 
incorporated into its codification of Financial Reporting Policies
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(“Codification”), that one of the relationships that must be considered in 
making independence determinations is the relationship created by 
rendering legal services. The Commission stated,
“ ‘Certain concurrent occupations of accountants engaged in the practice 
of public accounting involve relationships with clients that may 
jeopardize the accountant’s objectivity and, therefore, his independence. 
In general, this situation arises because the relationships and activities 
customarily associated with this occupation are not compatible with the 
auditor’s appearance of complete objectivity or because the primary 
objectives of such occupations are fundamentally different from those of 
a public accountant...
“ ‘A legal counsel enters into a personal relationship with a client and is 
primarily concerned with the personal rights and interests of such client. 
An independent accountant is precluded from such a relationship under 
the Securities Acts because the role is inconsistent with the appearance 
of independence required of accountants in reporting to public investors.’ 
(Emphasis added in OCA letter).
“Accordingly, OCA would consider a firm’s independence from an SEC 
registrant to be impaired if that firm also provides legal advice to the 
registrant or its affiliates...”15
15Letter. Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, SEC to Sherwin P. Simmons, Chair, CMDP, 
ABA. January 22, 1999.
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